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THE CFPB’S ENDAROUND
Chris O’Brien+
Michael Marcus has been considering buying a used vehicle for several
months.1 He gives the salesman his name, address, and social security number;
however, without Michael’s knowledge, the salesman changes the information
on his credit application.2 Michael’s information is sent to a creditor who,
without verifying any of the information on the credit application, immediately
“approves” the application at a rate of 14.9%.3 After a few months, Michael
realizes that his interest rate is extremely high and that he is unable to qualify
for a credit card.4 As it turns out, the salesman’s falsification of Michael’s credit
history not only increased his interest rate for the car but also destroyed his credit
rating.5 Now, Michael is stuck with a car that he can’t afford and his credit has
been destroyed.6 The abusive practices seen in Michael’s case, such as charging
disproportionately higher interest rates to certain borrowers and overextending
credit, have recently come under scrutiny because they mirror the activities that
contributed to the mortgage crisis in 2008.7
For many consumers, the design of most cities and the lack of reliable public
transportation make a vehicle a necessity.8 When consumers have poor credit,
purchasing a vehicle can be a cumbersome task because lenders use
creditworthiness as a measure of the likelihood a loan will be repaid.9 The task
is especially cumbersome for subprime borrowers: “individual[s] with a less+
J.D., The Catholic University of America, Columbus School of Law, 2018; B.A., The University
of Maryland – College Park, 2014. Thank you to Professor Heidi Schooner for her guidance and
expertise, and for patiently keeping me focused on a single topic throughout the writing process.
Thank you also to the Catholic University Law Review for their assistance in publishing this
Comment. Finally, I would like to extend my sincerest gratitude to my friends and family for their
unyielding support of all my endeavors.
1. This example is based loosely on Marcus v. Plaza Auto Mall, Ltd. See Brief of PlaintiffAppellant at *3, Marcus v. Plaza Auto Mall, Ltd., No. 200-307186, 2004 WL 3719320 (N.Y.A.D.
Apr. 16, 2004).
2. Id.
3. See id. at *2–3.
4. Id.
5. See id.
6. Id.
7. See David Heath, Buyer Beware: Car Dealers Adopt Outlawed Mortgage Tactics, New
Consumer Agency Powerless Against Them, CTR. FOR PUB. INTEGRITY (May 19, 2014, 12:19 PM),
https://www.publicintegrity.org/2011/04/11/4070/buyer-beware.
8. CAROLYN L. CARTER ET AL., CONSUMER CREDIT REGULATION: CREDIT CARDS,
PAYDAY LOANS, AUTO FINANCE AND OTHER NON-MORTGAGE CREDIT 447 (1st ed. 2012).
9. See OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, A-RCR, RATING CREDIT RISK:
COMPTROLLER’S HANDBOOK 1 (2001), https://www.occ.gov/publications/publications-by-type/co
mptrollers-handbook/rating-credit-risk/pub-ch-rating-credit-risk.pdf.

365

366

Catholic University Law Review

[Vol. 67:2

than-perfect credit rating.”10 When a consumer has a subprime credit rating,
fewer lenders are willing to extend credit to that consumer.11 Consequently, it
is difficult for subprime borrowers to obtain loans, and when they do, the loans
come with significantly higher interest rates to compensate the lender for the
increased risk.12
Following the housing bubble and subsequent economic crisis of 2008,
subprime lending came under close scrutiny.13 Although many believed that the
enactment of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act
(Dodd-Frank)14 would protect against future meltdowns, concern is growing
about a potential bubble in auto loan market.15 The heart of this concern is that
automobile lenders are over-extending credit to subprime borrowers—behavior
eerily reminiscent of pre-2008 mortgage lending—which could make the
automotive industry ripe for a repeat of 2008.16

10. Glossary: Subprime Borrower, LENDINGTREE , https://www.lendingtree.com/glossary/
what-is-subprime-borrower (last visited Dec. 28, 2017). Subprime borrowers typically have any
number of the following characteristics: a FICO score below 660, recent delinquencies, a
foreclosure in the last two years, a recent bankruptcy, a poor debt-to-income ratio, and trouble
paying living expenses. Id.
11. See id. (“A subprime borrower is someone whose credit history has blemishes on
it. Because of this, a subprime borrower may find getting a mortgage to be a bit difficult, but it is
still possible. However, subprime borrowers are often subject to higher interest rates.”).
12. See id.
13. See Chris Matthews, The Subprime Mortgage Crisis Wasn’t About Subprime Mortgages,
FORTUNE (June 17, 2015), http://fortune.com/2015/06/17/subprime-mortgage-recession/ (“In the
years following the financial crisis . . . journalists zeroed in on one set of villains: subprime lenders
and the supposedly irresponsible borrowers who were their customers. We were regaled with stories
of mortgage lenders like Countrywide handing out loans that borrowers couldn’t possibly repay,
and then selling them on to investment banks, who packaged them into ‘toxic’ bundles like
Goldman Sachs’ infamous Abacus collateralized debt obligation.”).
14. Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C).
15. See, e.g., Matt Egan, U.S. Government Worried About Risky Car Loans, CNN (July 11,
2016), http://money.cnn.com/2016/07/11/investing/auto-loans-risk-occ/.
16. See Allan Smith, The U.S. Auto Loan Debt Market is Reminiscent of the Subprime
Mortgage Bubble, HUFFINGTON POST (Sept. 8, 2016), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/allansmith/the-us-auto-loan-debt-mar_b_11911206.html; Michael Snyder, The One Trillion Dollar
Consumer Auto Loan Bubble is Beginning to Burst, THE ECON. COLLAPSE (Sept. 6, 2016), http://th
eeconomiccollapseblog.com/archives/the-one-trillion-dollar-consumer-auto-loan-bubble-isbeginning-to-burst. As early as 2012, the following was observed:
The subprime auto lending market appears to be very similar to the subprime mortgage
lending market that existed [before] the financial crisis of 2008. Some of the current
tactics used by subprime auto lenders include: charging consumers hidden fees, lying
about interest rates, and inaccurate reporting of facts on borrowers’ loan applications.
Christopher K. Seide, Consumer Financial Protection Post Dodd-Frank: Solutions to Protect
Consumers Against Wrongful Foreclosure Practices and Predatory Subprime Auto Lending, 3 U.
P.R. BUS. L. J. 219, 250 (2012) (footnote omitted).
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In 2016, the volume of outstanding auto loans reached a new all-time high of
$1.072 trillion, an increase of more than forty percent from late 2009.17 In that
time, “subprime auto lending has more than doubled, while lending on terms
that reflect a good credit history has increased by only about half.” 18 Although
some see this trend as a signal of vitality in the automotive market, banks are
capitalizing on this market in precisely the same way they capitalized on the
housing market.19 This is leading to a sharp influx of lenders in the subprime
auto loan market, as well as a rise in deceptive and predatory lending practices
by dealers.20
The Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection (CFPB), created by DoddFrank, aims to ensure that “markets for consumer financial products are fair,
competitive, and transparent,” and has broad regulatory authority over consumer
financial markets.21 But due to lobbying efforts, Dodd-Frank excluded auto
dealers from the authority of the CFPB, thereby restricting the CFPB’s ability to
regulate the auto market.22 Despite a recent promulgation expanding the CFPB’s
regulatory authority over certain automobile dealers,23 subprime borrowers
remain targets for many dealers because of the sizable profits that dealers can
reap from them.24
Despite extensive regulations intended to protect consumers, consumers face
costly abuses totaling billions of dollars.25 Abuses like predatory lending,
inability to discharge auto loan debt in bankruptcy, and abusive debt collection
practices make it difficult for consumers to satisfy their debt obligations.26
17. Melinda Zabritski, State of the Automotive Finance Market: A Look at Loans and Leases
in Q4 2016, EXPERIAN (2016), http://www.experian.com/automotive/automotive-credit-webin
ar.html; Egan, supra note 15.
18. Editorial, Putting an End to Abusive Car Loans, N.Y. TIMES (June 13, 2015)
http://nyti.ms/1SdurwW [hereinafter Abusive Car Loans].
19. Seide, supra note 16, at 249–51.
20. See id.
21. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203,
§ 1021, 124 Stat. 1376, 1979–80 (2010).
22. Daniel Indiviglio, 5 Ways Lobbyists Influenced the Dodd-Frank Bill, THE ATLANTIC (July
5, 2010), http://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2010/07/5-ways-lobbyists-influenced-thedodd-frank-bill/59137.
23. Defining Larger Participants of the Automobile Financing Market and Defining Certain
Automobile Leasing Activity as a Financial Product or Service, 80 Fed. Reg. 37,496 (June 30,
2015) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pts. 1001 and 1090) [hereinafter “Defining Larger Participants”].
24. CARTER ET AL., supra note 8, at 447 (“[G]enerally one half or more of dealer’s profits
come not from the sale of cars, but from the sale of financing and related products.”); Heath, supra
note 7.
25. Abusive Car Loans, supra note 18.
26. For a discussion of issues relating to bankruptcy, see Chunlin Leonhard, Negative
Externalities and Subprime Auto Financing: Time to Let the Hanging Paragraph Go, 45 U. TOL.
L. REV. 267 (2014) (describing how a bankruptcy provision that prevents debtors from discharging
auto loan debt by bankruptcy hinders their ability to productively participate in the economy) and
Miyong Mary Kang, Comment, Is It Time to Hang the Hanging Paragraph, 11 U.S.C. § 1325(A)?,
26 EMORY BANKR. DEV. J. 49 (2009) (arguing that, under the title bankruptcy provision, debtors
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Although some see the CFPB’s expansion of regulatory authority over auto
dealers as a step toward curtailing these issues, others view this as the CFPB
overstepping its authority, thereby harming the very consumers they seek to
help.27
This Comment argues that the auto dealer exemption in Dodd-Frank should
remain in place and further regulation of the subprime auto loan market is
unnecessary because the factors that contributed to the collapse of the mortgage
market are absent in today’s auto loan market. In addition, the current
regulations are sufficient to protect consumers from abusive, predatory, and
deceptive practices. Part I of this Comment discusses the market conditions that
led up to the enactment of Dodd-Frank and how the CFPB regulates the
automotive finance market. Part II discusses the various consumer protection
issues prevalent in the industry today. Finally, Part III recommends keeping the
current regulatory system in place and discusses the potential costs of increased
regulation.
I. EVENTS THAT FORMED THE CURRENT REGULATORY SCHEME
A. The Economic Crisis of 2008
In the years leading up to the economic crisis of 2008, deregulation of the
market, predatory lending practices, and the securitization of subprime loans set
in motion a chain of events that would cripple the U.S. economy. In the
aftermath, Congress passed Dodd-Frank in an effort to prevent another crisis.
1. Growth of the Housing Bubble
The beginning of the twenty-first century was marked by the bursting of the
tech bubble, a decline in consumer spending, rising energy prices, and rising
unemployment.28 In 2002, Congress passed the Sarbanes-Oxley Act29 to quell
public outrage regarding stock market losses and countless instances of
corporate fraud.30 Although the Sarbanes-Oxley Act brought accountability to
corporate officers engaging in securities fraud, it did little to hinder the growth
of a housing bubble that would play an important role in the 2008 economic

should be able to fully repay their debts by surrendering their cars so that debtors are not left having
to pay the difference between the remaining debt and the depreciated value of the car when, in all
likelihood, they would be unable to do so).
27. See Richard J. Zack et al., The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau Takes the Equal
Credit Opportunity Act for a Spin in the Indirect Auto Lending Industry and Crashes into Dealer
Markup Policies, 45 UCC L.J. 4 (2014) (on file with Catholic University Law Review).
28. Stephen M. Bainbridge, Dodd-Frank: Quack Federal Corporate Governance Round II,
95 MINN. L. REV. 1779, 1779 (2011).
29. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002).
30. Bainbridge, supra note 28, at 1779–80.
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crisis.31 As a result of low interest rates, “the deregulatory strategy of allowing
nonbank financial intermediaries to provide services virtually indistinguishable
from those of banks,” increasing rates of unemployment, and irresponsible
behavior by both subprime borrowers and lenders, a bubble in the housing
market developed where housing prices rose and peaked in early 2006.32
Subprime borrowers are often targets for predatory loans designed to exploit
unsophisticated, vulnerable borrowers.33 As the result of deregulation in
financial markets and low interest rates, lenders were extending credit to
subprime borrowers who were unlikely to repay their debts.34 Although
subprime loans by their nature carry with them a higher risk of default, lenders
were able to lessen this risk through securitization.35 Securitization improves
market liquidity and incentivizes lenders to extend credit regardless of a
consumers’ ability to repay.36
In November 2007, the Center for Responsible Lending reported that 7.2
million families held a subprime mortgage, 14.44% of subprime mortgages were
in default, and $1.3 trillion worth of subprime loans were outstanding.37 When
housing prices began falling in late 2007, panic swept over the financial market,
and large banks struggled to find funding.38 As consumer default rates rose and
home values declined, the Federal Reserve cut interest rates in an effort to curb
the rapid decline in the stock market.39
By 2008, financial institutions were suffering massive losses, and the U.S.
government began stepping in to “bail out” commercial and investment banks.40
As housing prices continued to fall, unemployment rates rose, commercial
institutions once considered “too big to fail” were on the brink of collapse, and
stock prices fell to all-time lows, the United States fell into one of the worst
31. See Congressional Comments About Sarbanes-Oxley, 15 FED. SENT’G REP. 252, 252
(2003).
32. RICHARD A. POSNER, A FAILURE OF CAPITALISM: THE CRISIS OF ‘08 AND THE DESCENT
INTO DEPRESSION 22–23 (2009); accord ROBERT J. SHILLER, IRRATIONAL EXUBERANCE 62 (3d
ed. 2015).
33. Sally Pitman, Comment, Arms, But No Legs To Stand On: “Subprime” Solutions Plague
the Subprime Mortgage Crisis, 40 TEX. TECH L. REV. 1089, 1095 (2008). For common
characteristics of subprime borrowers, see supra note 10 and accompanying text.
34. See Seide, supra note 16, at 224.
35. See Pitman, supra note 33, at 1102; see also Leonhard, supra note 26, at 286.
Securitization is the process where “interests in loans and other receivables are packaged,
underwritten, and sold in the form of ‘asset-backed’ securities.” OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF
THE CURRENCY, L-SEC, ASSET SECURITIZATION: COMPTROLLER’S HANDBOOK 2 (1997),
https://www.occ.treas.gov/publications/publications-by-type/comptrollers-handbook/asset-securi
tization/pub-ch-asset-securitization.pdf.
36. Pitman, supra note 33, at 1098.
37. CTR. FOR RESPONSIBLE LENDING, SNAPSHOT OF THE SUBPRIME MARKET 1 (2007),
http://www.responsiblelending.org/pdfs/snapshot-of-the-subprime-market.pdf.
38. Seide, supra note 16, at 225.
39. Pitman, supra note 33, at 1103.
40. Seide, supra note 16, at 229–30.

370

Catholic University Law Review

[Vol. 67:2

recessions since the Great Depression.41 In the aftermath, many government and
industry officials have agreed that subprime lending was one of the major causes
of the 2008 financial crisis.42
2. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act
In response to the financial crisis, President Obama signed Dodd-Frank into
law on July 21, 2010.43 The purpose of Dodd-Frank is “to promote the financial
stability of the United States by improving accountability and transparency in
the financial system, to end ‘too big to fail’, to protect the American taxpayer by
ending bailouts, to protect consumers from abusive financial services practices,
and for other purposes.” 44 Dodd-Frank has many key provisions, including:
(1) consumer protections; (2) systemic risk oversight; (3) executive
compensation regulation; (4) bank capital requirements; (5) ending
“too big to fail” bailouts; (6) transparency and accountability relating
to complex financial instruments; (7) enforcement of current
regulations; (8) reform of the Federal Reserve; (9) mortgage lending
reform; (10) hedge fund oversight; (11) control over credit rating
agencies; (12) reform of insurance regulations and investor
protections; and (13) addressing securitization and municipal
securities.45
3. The Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection
Pursuant to Dodd-Frank, Congress enacted the Consumer Financial Protection
Act of 2010 (CFPA), which established the CFPB.46 The CFPB was created “to
implement and enforce federal consumer financial laws in order to promote
fairness, transparency, and competition in markets for consumer financial
products and services.” 47 The CFPB is an independent agency with rulemaking

41. Id. at 230–32; accord Pitman, supra note 33, at 1105.
42. See KATALINA M. BIANCO, THE SUBPRIME LENDING CRISIS: CAUSES AND EFFECTS OF
THE MORTGAGE MELTDOWN 3 (2008) (“Many experts and economists believe [the crisis] came
about th[r]ough [sic] the combination of a number of factors in which subprime lending played a
major part.”); see also FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY COMMISSION, FINAL REPORT OF THE
NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE CAUSES OF THE FINANCIAL AND ECONOMIC CRISIS IN THE
UNITED STATES 18–23 (2011) (finding that widespread failures in regulation and supervision, a
failure of corporate governance and risk management, and a systemic breakdown in accountability
and ethics in the markets were the key factors in causing the crisis). But see Matthews, supra note
13.
43. Seide, supra note 16, at 235.
44. Pub. L. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376, 1376 (2010).
45. Seide, supra note 16, at 235–36 (citing Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat.
1376 (2010)).
46. See 12 U.S.C. § 5491 (2012); Karoline E. Andris & Kenneth J. Rojc, Automotive Finance:
Impact of the Dodd-Frank Act, 67 BUS. LAW. 597, 597 (2012).
47. Kim B. Perez, Note, The CFPB “Indirectly” Regulates Lending Through Auto Dealers,
18 N.C. BANKING INST. 399, 401 (2014); see 12 U.S.C. § 5511(a).
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authority and power to enforce consumer laws such as the Truth in Lending Act
(TILA), the Equal Credit Opportunity Act (ECOA), the Fair Credit Reporting
Act (FCRA), and the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA).48 Before
Congress consolidated consumer financial protection “rulemaking, supervisory,
and enforcement authority” under the CFPB, this power was shared by seven
different federal agencies.49
In addition to the CFPB, several other federal agencies “oversee the activities,
products, and services that auto finance companies offer.”50 The Federal Trade
Commission (FTC), which has authority over “deceptive trade practices and
debt collection activities,”51 gathers information on possible consumer
protection issues and “brings enforcement actions against auto credit providers
for deceptive practices.” 52 The Department of Justice (DOJ) is responsible for
enforcing fair lending laws.53 Finally, states also retain enforcement powers
over the provisions in the CFPA.54
Section 1029 of Dodd-Frank excludes auto dealers from the CFPB’s
authority.55 The inclusion of this provision has been attributed to lobbyists such
as former Senator Sam Brownback who asserted that auto dealers were not
responsible for the financial crisis and therefore should not be federally
regulated by the CFPB.56 As a result, the CFPB is prohibited from exercising
any rulemaking, supervisory, or enforcement authority over “a motor vehicle
dealer that is predominantly engaged in the sale and servicing of motor vehicles,
the leasing and servicing of motor vehicles, or both.” 57 However, Dodd-Frank
48. 12 U.S.C. §§ 1001, 1002(12), 1002(14), 1022(a); 12 U.S.C. §§ 5481(12), 5491(a).
49. US Consumer Regulatory Law: Overview, PRACTICAL LAW FINANCE, WL Practice Note
0-541-5546 (last visited Jan. 5, 2018) [hereinafter Regulatory Law: Overview]. This included the
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (national banks), Federal Reserve Board (state-chartered
member banks), Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (state-chartered non-member banks and
other state-chartered banking institutions), National Credit Union Administration (federallyinsured credit unions), Office of Thrift Supervision (federal savings and loan associations and
thrifts), the FTC (consumer protection generally), and HUD (housing). Id.
50. Kevin M. McDonald & Kenneth J. Rojc, Automotive Finance: Shifting into Regulatory
Overdrive, 69 BUS. LAW. 599, 599 (2014).
51. Id.
52. Kwesi D. Atta-Krah, Note, Preventing a Boom from Turning Bust: Regulators Should
Turn Their Attention to Starter Interrupt Devices Before the Subprime Auto Lending Bubble Bursts,
101 IOWA L. REV. 1187, 1201 (2016).
53. McDonald & Rojc, supra note 50, at 599.
54. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124
Stat. 1376, § 1042; see Regulatory Law: Overview, supra note 49; see also 12 U.S.C. § 5514(b)(3)
(2012) (discussing coverage of the Larger Participant Rule and the requirement that the CFPB
consult with the FTC before issuing a new rule).
55. 12 U.S.C. § 5519.
56. See Indiviglio, supra note 22; Janet Hook & Jim Puzzanghera, Battle over Financial Form
Pits Auto Dealers vs. Military, L.A. TIMES (May 13, 2010) http://articles.latimes.com/2010/may/
13/business/la-fi-car-dealers-20100514.
57. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act § 1029; see Dodd-Frank
Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, PL 111-203, July 21, 2010, 124 Stat 1376, Title
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does not exclude: (a) dealers who “provide consumers with any services related
to residential or commercial mortgages or self-financing transactions involving
real property”; (b) dealers “who extend credit or leases involving motor vehicles
directly to consumers and does not routinely assign the governing contract to an
unaffiliated third party”; or (c) dealers who “offer[] a consumer financial product
or service unrelated to a motor vehicle.”58
Although the CFPB is largely precluded from regulating motor vehicle
dealers, the Federal Reserve Board and the FTC are still able to do so.59
According to Congress, the CFPA provides the FTC with authority to “prescribe
unfair or deceptive trade practice rules against automobile dealers in accordance
with the standard informal rulemaking procedures of the Administrative
Procedure Act rather than having to adhere to the much more rigorous
procedures of the Magnuson-Moss Act, [which the FTC must normally
follow].”60 Indeed, Congress believed that the CFPA “ma[de] it somewhat
easier for the FTC to regulate [auto dealers].” 61 Although the FTC has broad
power to prohibit any practice that it determines to be unfair or deceptive by
motor vehicle dealers, even if the practice or act is related to vehicle financing,
the FTC has not exercised this power as of 2015.62
The CFPB has the authority to “prevent a covered person or service provider
from committing or engaging in an unfair, deceptive, or abusive act or practice
under Federal law in connection with any transaction with a consumer for a
consumer financial product or service, or the offering of a consumer financial
product or service.” 63 A covered person is “any person that engages in offering
or providing a consumer financial product or service.” 64 The CFPB also has
regulatory authority over any covered person who “is a larger participant of a
market for other consumer financial products or services,” and is authorized by
Dodd-Frank to define “larger participants” of certain financial markets.65 In
addition, the CFPB has authority over those who “the Bureau has reasonable
cause to determine . . . is engaging, or has engaged, in conduct that poses risks
X § 1029; CCH, DODD-FRANK WALL STREET REFORM AND CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT: LAW,
EXPLANATION AND ANALYSIS 499–500 (Andrew A. Turner et al. eds., 2010) [hereinafter CCH].
58. SUSAN BERSON & DAVE BERSON, THE DODD-FRANK WALL STREET REFORM AND
CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT: FROM LEGISLATION TO IMPLEMENTATION TO LITIGATION 59–60
(2012); accord 12 U.S.C. § 5519(b).
59. See ABA, REVIEW OF CONSUMER PROTECTION LAW DEVELOPMENTS, 222–23 (2011);
CCH, supra note 57, at 500; D. Patrick Yoest et al., Adjusting to the CFPB’s Auto Finance
Examination Authority, 69 CONSUMER FIN. L.Q. REP. 224, 226 (2015).
60. DAVID H. CARPENTER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41338, THE DODD-FRANK WALL
STREET REFORM AND CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT: TITLE X, THE CONSUMER FINANCIAL
PROTECTION BUREAU 10 (2010) (footnotes omitted).
61. Id.
62. Yoest et. al, supra note 59, at 226.
63. 12 U.S.C. § 5531(a) (2012).
64. § 1002(6)(A).
65. § 5514(a)(1)(B).

2018]

The CFPB's Endaround

373

to consumers with regard to the offering or provision of consumer financial
products or services.”66
Although the CFPB has broad power, it cannot declare something “unfair”
unless there exists a reasonable basis to conclude that “the act or practice causes
or is likely to cause substantial injury to consumers which is not reasonably
avoidable by consumers; and such substantial injury is not outweighed by
countervailing benefits to consumers or to competition.”67 Although this
requirement is effective to curtail some of the CFPB’s power, a unique feature
of Dodd-Frank is the creation of the “abusive” standard, which provides the
CFPB with expansive authority to regulate the market.68 Under this standard,
the CFPB can declare an act abusive only if it:
[m]aterially interferes with the ability of a consumer to understand a
term or condition of a consumer financial product or service; or takes
unreasonable advantage of a lack of understanding on the part of the
consumer of the material risks, costs, or conditions of the product of
service; the inability of the consumer to protect the interest of the
consumer in selecting or using a consumer financial product or
service; or the reasonable reliance by the consumer on a covered
person to act in the interests of the consumer.69
B. Automobile Industry During and After the 2008 Crisis
In the aftermath of the financial collapse, the automobile industry recovered
quickly.70 In 2015, auto loans topped $1 trillion for the first time—an increase
of more than forty percent from 2009.71 Even compared to prime auto lending,
subprime auto lending has been booming in recent years, growing at a rate in
excess of 130% since the financial crisis.72 Between 2009 and 2014, the
percentages of used car loans that franchise auto makers made to subprime
borrowers increased from 17% to 25.4%.73 This increase in used car loans is
interesting in light of Department of Transportation statistics showing that the

66. § 5514(a)(1)(C).
67. § 5531(c).
68. Seide, supra note 16, at 241–42.
69. § 5531(d).
70. Cristian deRitis, Is U.S. Auto Lending About to Bubble Over?, MOODY’S ANALYTICS
(Aug. 12, 2014), https://www.economy.com/dismal/analysis/free/249410; see also MANHEIM,
2016 USED CAR MARKET REPORT 10 (2016), https://www.manheim.com/content_pdfs/products/
UCMR-2016.pdf (“Autos have clearly been a gem in an otherwise dull economy.”).
71. Claudia Assis & Rachel Koning Beals, Subprime Car Loans Aren’t Subprime Mortgages
Yet Still Worry Jamie Dimon and, now, John Oliver, MARKETWATCH (Aug. 15, 2016) http://www.
marketwatch.com/story/could-subprime-auto-loans-lead-to-same-economic-catastrophe-as-riskymortgages-2016-07-27; Egan, supra note 15.
72. Atta-Krah, supra note 52, at 1209; Assis & Beals, supra note 71.
73. Atta-Krah, supra note 52, at 1195.
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percentage of people using an automobile as a primary means of transportation
to work has remained relatively constant since 1999.74
For many, a vehicle is invaluable and may be the only way for consumers “to
travel to work and earn a paycheck.”75 Despite a general lack of public
discussion regarding the issue, legislators have been concerned about the state
of the auto industry since 2009.76 The House Subcommittee on Commerce,
Trade, and Consumer Protection found evidence suggesting that “fraudulent
practices with regard to both the condition and financing of used cars are on the
rise.” 77 In particular, Representative John Sarbanes found that “in the purchase
and sale of automobiles . . . [t]here is a legion of opportunities to take advantage
of people and exploit people.” 78
Much of this concern revolves around how consumers finance automobile
purchases. Consumers can obtain an auto loan through either direct or indirect
financing.79 Through direct financing, the consumer seeks credit directly from
a lender, such as a bank or credit union.80 When a consumer obtains indirect
financing, an auto dealer collects credit information about the applicant and
facilitates a loan from a third party.81 The indirect lender will then offer the
dealer a minimum interest rate on the loan, called the “buy rate.” 82 The dealer
then offers a slightly higher rate to the consumer, either splitting the difference
between this rate and the buy rate with the lender or retaining any interest over
the buy rate as compensation.83 Although this “one-stop shop[]” can be
beneficial to consumers, dealers and creditors often “work together to needlessly

74. Bureau of Transp. Statistics, Table 1-41: Principle Means of Transportation to Work
(Thousands), DEPT. OF TRANSP. (2017), http://www.rita.dot.gov/bts/sites/rita.dot.gov.bts/files/pub
lications/national_transportation_statistics/html/table_01_41.html.
75. See Consumer Protection in the Used and Subprime Car Market: Hearing Before the
Subcommittee on Commerce, Trade, and Consumer Protection of the Committee on Energy and
Commerce, 111th Cong. 6 (2009) (statement of Rep. George Radanovich, H.R. Subcomm. on
Comm., Trade, & Consumer Prot.).
76. Id. at 1 (statement of Rep. Bobby L. Rush, Chairman, H.R. Subcomm. on Com., Trade,
& Consumer Prot.) (“While the mortgage and home foreclosure crisis has garnered much-deserved
attention in Congress and in the media, there has been much less focus on similar problems that are
associated with the purchase of automobiles although repossession rates are on the rise and only
getting worse.”).
77. Id.
78. Id. at 10 (statement of Rep. John P. Sarbanes, H.R. Subcomm. on Com., Trade, &
Consumer Prot.).
79. See id. at 214 (response by witness John Van Alst to questions from Rep. Doris Matsui).
80. CFPB Proposes Federal Oversight of Auto Lending Companies, CONSUMER FIN. PROT.
BUREAU (Sept. 17, 2014), http://www.consumerfinance.gov/about-us/newsroom/cfpb-proposesnew-federal-oversight-of-nonbank-auto-finance-companies/ [hereinafter CFPB Proposes Federal
Oversight].
81. Perez, supra note 47, at 402–03.
82. Id. at 403.
83. Id.; CARTER ET AL., supra note 8.
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saddle customers with high-interest-rate loans” that charge astronomical fees.84
Dealers often seek to increase their profits by including unnecessary add-ons,
which increase the purchase price of the vehicle and consequently, the amount
of principle on which the consumer pays interest.85
In early 2016, the number of car borrowers at least sixty days late on their
payments had risen to 5.16%, higher than during the financial crisis.86 Further,
Experian, one of the three major credit reporting agencies, reported that in 2016,
“[i]ncreases in both [thirty and sixty]-day delinquency rates [rose] as the
percentage of loans in the subprime portion of open portfolios [grew].” 87 One
would expect that high delinquency rates, particularly in the subprime area,
would deter lenders from extending credit to borrowers; however, investors are
often attracted to the debt because “the riskier the borrower, the higher the
yield.” 88 This behavior has contributed to a large influx of new issuers entering
the subprime auto asset-backed securities market.89
Banks, hedge funds, and private equity groups have been successfully
marketing these bonds to traditionally conservative investors because these
securitized investments offer high rates of return and repossessing vehicles are
relatively easier than foreclosing homes.90 According to JPMorgan Chase, the
recent rise in delinquencies “can be traced back to new issuers crowding into the
booming industry.”91 As new lenders scramble to enter the auto lending market,

84. Consumer Protection in the Used and Subprime Car Market: Hearing Before the
Subcommittee on Commerce, Trade, and Consumer Protection of the Committee on Energy and
Commerce, 111th Cong. 2 (2009) (statement of Rep. Bobby L. Rush, Chairman, H.R. Subcomm.
on Com., Trade, & Consumer Prot.).
85. See CARTER ET AL., supra note 8, at 447–48; NATIONAL CONSUMER LAW CENTER, THE
PRACTICE OF CONSUMER LAW § 9.2.4 (2d ed. 2006). Dealer financing markups have been well
recognized as disproportionately affecting minority car buyers. Jean Braucher & Angela Littwin,
Examination as a Method of Consumer Protection, 58 ARIZ. L. REV. 33, 83 (2016); Christopher
M.A. Chamness et al., Subprime Auto Finance Developments, 71 BUS. LAW. 723, 724 (2016); Zack
et al., supra note 24. However, this is beyond the scope of this comment.
86. Tracy Alloway, This Is What’s Going On Beneath the Subprime Auto-Loan Turmoil,
BLOOMBERG (Mar. 21, 2016), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-03-21/this-is-wh
at-s-going-on-beneath-the-subprime-auto-loan-turmoil. Delinquencies during the financial crisis
peaked at 5.04%. Matt Scully, Subprime Auto Bond Delinquencies Highest in 20 Years, Says Fitch,
BLOOMBERG (Mar. 14, 2016), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-03-14/subprimeauto-bond-delinquencies-highest-in-20-years-says-fitch.
87. Melinda Zabritski, State of the Automotive Finance Market: A look at loans and leases in
Q1 2016, EXPERIAN AUTOMOTIVE, http://www.experian.com/automotive/automotive-creditwebinar.html (last visited Dec 29, 2017).
88. See Scully, supra note 86.
89. Alloway, supra note 86.
90. Jeff Kirk, Subprime Auto Loans, The Rising Menace of Wall Street’s Latest Darling, 18
J. CONSUMER & COM. L. 72, 72 (2014).
91. Alloway, supra note 86. In 2010, Santander Consumer USA and GM Financial issued
93.5% of the market’s notes, while in 2016 they accounted for less than half of the market. Fitch:
Reprieve for U.S. Subprime Auto Delinquencies Likely Short-Lived, FITCH RATINGS (Apr. 14,

376

Catholic University Law Review

[Vol. 67:2

there is concern that these lenders will “lower their underwriting standards as
they fight for market share in an effort to produce relatively quick returns.” 92
Delinquency rates on subprime loans issued by new lenders are often higher as
compared to more established players.93 Thus, there is concern that the subprime
auto loan market is on the verge of collapse.94
C. Recent Trends in the Automotive Finance Industry and Consumer
Protection
The state of the automotive finance market has caused mounting concerns
about another bubble budding in the subprime auto loan market.95 In spite of
regulatory efforts, lenders in the automotive lending industry are engaging in
practices disallowed in mortgage lending.96 In addition, some lenders are
engaging in predatory lending, which has been linked to higher default and
repossession rates among subprime borrowers.97 In thirty-seven states and
Washington, D.C., more than half of consumers are forced to take subprime
loans because their credit scores are too low.98 This statistic could have major
implications as the majority of predatory lending practices target consumers with
low credit ratings.99
Subprime auto finance has been linked to allegations of “reverse redlining . .
. abusive title loans and repossession practices, loan values that exceed the
values of the vehicle, and hidden defects in used cars marketed to subprime
borrowers.” 100 In addition, subprime lenders have been sharply criticized for
charging hidden fees, inaccurate reporting on loan applications, lying about
interest rates, use of indirect lending methods, and abusive debt collection
methods.101 The Center for Responsible Lending speculates that dealer markups
2016), https://www.fitchratings.com/site/pr/1002494 [hereinafter Fitch: Reprieve for U.S.
Subprime Auto Delinquencies].
92. Alloway, supra note 86.
93. Id.
94. See Kirk, supra note 90, at 74. For a discussion of how lending and collateral values
contribute to the creation of an asset bubble, see GEORGE SOROS, THE ALCHEMY OF FINANCE:
READING THE MIND OF THE MARKET (1989).
95. See Alice Holbrook, Is There a Subprime Auto Loan Bubble?, USA TODAY (Sept. 27,
2014), http://www.usatoday.com/story/money/personalfinance/2014/09/27/subprime-auto-loan/1
6272641/. But see Assis & Beals, supra note 71.
96. Holbrook, supra note 95.
97. Abusive Car Loans, supra note 18.
98. Nirah Chokshi, Map: Majorities of Consumers in 37 States Have Subprime Credit Scores,
WASH. POST (Feb. 27, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/govbeat/wp/2014/02/27/m
ap-majorities-of-consumers-in-37-states-have-subprime-credit-scores/.
99. See Kathleen C. Engel & Patricia A. McCoy, A Tale of Three Markets: The Law and
Economics of Predatory Lending, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1255, 1261 (2002).
100. Chamness et al., supra note 85, at 723–24 (footnote omitted). Reverse redlining is the
“targeting of minorities with the most expensive loans.” Id.
101. See Atta-Krah, supra note 52, at 1210 (describing how some lenders condition their loans
on receiving the borrower’s permission to install starter interrupt devices (SIDs) in the borrower’s
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on loans could cost consumers “an additional $25.8 billion over the lives of their
loans.”102
1. Predatory Lending
Predatory loans are characterized by a set of practices and terms including:
“(1) loans structured to result in seriously disproportionate net harm to
borrowers, (2) harmful rent seeking, (3) loans involving fraud or deceptive
practices, (4) other forms of lack of transparency in loans that are not actionable
as fraud, and (5) loans that require borrowers to waive meaningful legal
redress.”103 In most cases, predatory loans are also subprime loans; however,
prime-interest loans may “display one or more of the problems that are common
to predatory loans.” 104
In 2015, the New York Independent Democratic Caucus published a report
focused on eight allegedly deceptive lending practices that are unregulated in
the subprime market.105 These included “auto credit with ‘abusively high
interest rates’ . . . ; high loan-to-value ratios due to negative equity and ancillary
product financing; dealer financing markups . . . ; dealer fraud in forcing buyers
to purchase ‘optional’ ancillary products . . . ; spot delivery; and the use of . . .
starter interrupt devices.” 106 Although the subprime auto lending market has
only recently come under scrutiny, the FTC has been investigating allegations
of illegal lending practices for more than a decade.107
The prevalence of deceptive and abusive practices in the automotive industry
is unsurprising due to the large profits that can be made through auto loans.108
These loans often “contain hidden charges and other essentially useless add-ons
like credit insurance.”109 Dealers reap the benefits of these markups by “acting
as a middleman” between the consumer and the lender when the consumer opts
for “dealer financing.” 110 The lender gives the dealer discretion to quote a
car that allow lenders to disable a car when the borrower falls behind on payments); McDonald &
Rojc, supra note 50, at 604 (describing how some lenders make “false threats of lawsuits,” lie about
being able to waive debts, and charge late fees for debt payments even when the borrower pays on
time); Seide, supra note 16, at 250 (describing how some lenders charge borrowers “hidden fees,”
lie about the interest rate on loans, and inaccurately report borrowers’ information).
102. See Abusive Car Loans, supra note 18.
103. Engel & McCoy, supra note 99, at 1260.
104. Id. at 1261.
105. Chamness et al., supra note 85, at 724.
106. Id. at 724–25.
107. See Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, FTC Testifies on Its Efforts to Combat Unfair
and Deceptive Subprime Lending (Feb. 24, 2004), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releas
es/2004/02/ftc-testifies-its-efforts-combat-unfair-and-deceptive-subprime (describing enforcement
actions the agency has taken against illegal subprime mortgage lenders and efforts to educate “older
consumers” about abusive lending practices).
108. See Abusive Car Loans, supra note 18.
109. Id.
110. Id.
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higher interest rate and shares the surplus with the dealer.111 The possibility of
sharing in that surplus incentivizes the dealer to “sell” the consumer on
unnecessary add-ons that increase the price and consequently increases the
amount that can be quoted to the buyer.112 While exercising their discretion,
lenders have quoted minorities disproportionately higher interest rates than
white borrowers.113
Predatory loans have also been linked to “higher odds of default and
repossession for subprime borrowers,” and puts low-income consumers at higher
risk of auto-loan predation.114 Before the Federal Reserve outlawed the practice,
lenders were engaging in similar behavior in the mortgage market.115 In fact,
“[a]uto lending is the only major lending where dealer markup kickbacks
through indirect lending still occurs.”116 The CFPB supervises large banks
making auto loans—i.e., direct financing—but until recently, did not supervise
nonbank finance companies.117 Thus, there was potential for abuse, deception,
and predatory lending practices by nonbank finance companies.
Lenders have not been solely responsible for the issues fueling the recent
upswing in deceptive practices.118 The CFPB recently held a focus group to
research consumer experiences with auto financing.119 The results of the focus
group showed that most consumers: (1) did not conduct advance research on
available financing options, “[(2)] focused on the monthly payment and vehicle
price, [(3)] did not consider or attempt to negotiate financing or interest rates,
and [(4)] purchased add-on products despite having negative perceptions of the
sales process for add-ons.”120 Overall, the CFPB found among consumers “a
lack of understanding of financing options, difficulty understanding loan
features during loan negotiations, and problems with add-ons such as paying for
unwanted add-ons and reports of lenders insisting that the purchase of add-ons
was necessary for loan approval.”121
Despite concerns of deceptive lending practices and lack of education on the
part of consumers with respect to financing, the CFPB, FTC, and DOJ have

111. Id.
112. See id.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. See Heath, supra note 7.
116. Id. (quoting Chris Kukla, senior counsel at the Center for Responsible Lending).
117. CFPB Proposes Federal Oversight, supra note 80.
118. Barbara S. Mishkin, CFPB Unveils Know Before You Owe Auto Loan Initiative; Issues
Report on Consumer Auto Financing Experiences, BALLARD SPAHR LLP: CONSUMER FIN.
MONITOR (June 13, 2016), https://www.cfpbmonitor.com/2016/06/13/cfpb-unveils-know-beforeyou-owe-auto-loan-initiative-issues-report-on-consumer-auto-financing-experiences/.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id.
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brought only a handful of actions against lenders in recent years.122 These
enforcement actions, however, have proven to have far-reaching impacts.123
When the CFPB investigated Ally Financial Inc. and Ally Bank (Ally) and found
that “more than 235,000 African American [sic], Hispanic, Asian and Pacific
Islander borrowers paid higher interest rates for their auto loans between April
2011 and December 2013,” the CFPB forced Ally to establish a $80 million
settlement fund for certain minority borrowers, hire a settlement administrator
to distribute the funds to the victims, set up a compliance program to avoid
similar future violations, and fined Ally for $18 million.124 Thus, it is clear that
regulators possess the tools to identify and remedy deceptive lending practices.
2. Efforts by the CFPB to Address Consumer Financial Protection Issues
“Auto loans are the third largest category of household debt,” eclipsed “only
by mortgage and student loan debt.”125 According to CFPB Director Richard
Cordray, “[n]onbank auto finance companies extend hundreds of billions of
dollars in credit to American consumers, yet they have never been supervised at
the federal level.”126 On June 10, 2015, the CFPB exercised its rulemaking
authority under Dodd-Frank to define “larger participants.”127 Under the new
rule, a “nonbank covered person that engages in automobile financing is a larger
participant of the automobile financing market if it has at least 10,000 aggregate
annual originations.”128
When the CFPB proposed this rule, roughly thirty-eight entities met this
requirement, accounting for approximately ninety percent of the auto loan
market.129 The regulation was directed toward protecting consumers who seek
indirect financing through auto finance companies, specialty finance companies,

122. See Zack at al., supra note 27 (describing a joint CFPB and DOJ action against Ally
Financial, Inc. and Ally Bank); see also Michael Corkery & Jessica Silver-Greenberg, Santander
Consumer Gets Subpoena in Subprime Car Loan Inquiry, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 7, 2014), http://
dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/08/07/santander-consumer-gets-subpoena-in-subprime-inquiry/?_r=0
(describing a DOJ enforcement action against Santander Consumer USA); Peter N. Cubita, Another
Auto Finance Company Agrees to Change Dealer Compensation Policy to Settle ECOA Claims
Alleged by CFPB and DOJ, BALLARD SPAHR LLP: CONSUMER FIN. MONITOR (Feb. 8, 2016), htt
ps://www.cfpbmonitor.com/2016/02/08/another-auto-finance-company-agrees-to-change-dealercompensation-policy-to-settle-ecoa-claims-alleged-by-cfpb-and-doj/.
123. See Zack et al., supra note 27.
124. Id.
125. CFPB Proposes Federal Oversight, supra note 80.
126. Id.
127. CFPB to Oversee Nonbank Auto Finance Companies, CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU
(June 10, 2015), https://www.consumerfinance.gov/about-us/newsroom/cfpb-to-oversee-nonbankauto-financecompanies/. Dodd-Frank authorizes the CFPB to regulate nonbanks if they are “larger
participants” of the market. See 12 U.S.C. § 5514(a)(1)(b) (2012).
128. Defining Larger Participants, supra note 23, at 37,498.
129. CFPB Proposes Federal Oversight of Auto Lending Companies, PRACTICAL L. FIN., WL
Article 6-582-2226 (Sept. 24, 2014) [hereinafter Article 6-582-2226].
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captive nonbanks, and Buy Here Pay Here (BHPH) companies.130 Of these,
large “captive” nonbanks, which are subsidiary finance companies owned by
auto manufacturers, dominate the market, with specialty finance companies and
BHPH companies accounting for a significant portion of the remaining market
share.131 However, the new definition does not cover motor vehicle dealers, as
they are explicitly excluded from Dodd-Frank.132
Through the new rule, the CFPB seeks to ensure that auto lenders are “treating
consumers fairly by: [f]airly marketing and disclosing auto financing, . . .
[p]roviding accurate information to credit bureaus”; and “[t]reating consumers
fairly when collecting debts.”133 In particular, the new rule sought to address
“discriminatory pricing in the auto-lending market.”134 The CFPB found that
indirect auto financing presents a risk of discrimination because of “the
incentives these policies create, and the discretion they permit.”135 In addition,
the new rules have brought automobile leasing and BHPH companies under the
supervision of the CFPB.136 According to the CFPB, automobile leasing
amounts to the “functional equivalent” of purchase finance agreements because,
as in such agreements, consumers must provide largely the same information as
when seeking a loan and typically have the option to purchase the vehicle after
the lease period.137 The importance of automobiles to financial well-being and
auto finance’s position as the third largest category of household debt are
repeatedly cited as an important reason for increased regulation in this market.138
Proponents of the new rule view this as a step in the right direction toward
protecting consumers against unfair, deceptive, and predatory practices, thereby

130. Defining Larger Participants, supra note 23, at 37,507.
131. Id. at 37,507.
132. See 12 U.S.C. § 5519(a) (2012) (“The Bureau may not exercise any rulemaking,
supervisory, enforcement or any other authority, including any authority to order assessments, over
a motor vehicle dealer that is predominantly engaged in the sale and servicing of motor vehicles,
the leasing and servicing of motor vehicles, or both.”).
133. CFPB Proposes Federal Oversight, supra note 80.
134. Id.
135. CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, CFPB BULL. NO. 2013-2, INDIRECT AUTO LENDING
AND COMPLIANCE WITH THE EQUAL CREDIT OPPORTUNITY ACT 2 (2013), http://files.consumer
finance.gov/f/201303_cfpb_march_-Auto-Finance-Bulletin.pdf; see Richard Cordray, Prepared
Remarks of Director Richard Cordray at the National Community Reinvestment Coalition Annual
Conference, CONSUMER FIN. PROTECTION BUREAU (Mar. 22, 2013), http://www.consumerfinance.
gov/newsroom/prepared-remarks-of-director-richard-cordray-at-the-national-community-reinvest
ment-coalition-annual-conference/ (discussing the effect that discretionary markup policies have
on minority borrowers).
136. See Defining Larger Participants, supra note 23, at 37,498, 37,507.
137. Id. at 37,498–99.
138. See, e.g., id. (“From a consumer’s standpoint, whether a vehicle is leased or financed
through a loan, any act or practice that impedes access to a vehicle or otherwise creates problems
related to the loan or leasing arrangement can have a critical impact on the consumer.”); CFPB
Proposes Federal Oversight, supra note 80 (finding that “cars are indispensable for most working
Americans”).
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limiting the risk of another loan bubble.139 In fact, proponents claim that
additional regulations are necessary to fully protect consumers.140 Director
Cordray defends the Bureau’s actions on grounds that “nonbank finance
companies originate ‘about’ forty percent of auto loans made today and more
than eighty-five percent of auto leases.”141 He claims that the CFPB “permits
honest competition to flourish,” and the CFPB “provides valuable information
to Congress as its seeks to monitor the markets and prevent another financial
crisis.” 142 Moreover, the CFPB claims that the new Larger Participant Rule
“does not impose new substantive consumer protection requirements” because
“[n]onbank covered persons generally are subject to the Bureau’s regulatory and
enforcement authority, and any applicable Federal consumer financial law,
regardless of whether they are subject to the Bureau’s supervisory authority.” 143
Although market participants are concerned about additional compliance
costs imposed by the new rule, the CFPB expects the cost of compliance to be
minimal.144 The CFPB estimates that the total cost of an examination would
cost “less than one-tenth of [one] percent of total revenue from originations for
that year.”145 Further, the CFPB expects compliance costs to be “limited” for
both existing and newly covered entities, arguing that although FTC Act does
not impose the “abusive” standard, most practices covered by the new rule are
already covered by other sections of Dodd-Frank and the FTC Act.146
Furthermore, the CFPB believes that for those entities already subject to
supervision, additional costs will be “minimal.”147
On the other hand, many critics are concerned that the CFPB “overextends its
mandate, limits consumer choice[,] and negatively [affects] the economy.”148
The National Automobile Dealers Association and the National Association of
Minority Auto Dealers have expressed concern that this new rule will “increase
the cost of auto financing by impairing competition in the auto-lending
market.”149 In addition, critics argue that the new rule ignores that dealer
markups include “negotiation over purchase price and interest rate, and
139. See Atta-Krah, supra note 52, at 1217.
140. See, e.g., Erica N. Sweeting, Comment, Disabling Disabling Devices: Adopting
Parameters for Addressing a Predatory Auto-Lending Technique on Subprime Borrowers, 59
HOW. L.J. 817, 842 (2016).
141. Steven Harras, CFPB Chief Cordray Defends His Agency’s ‘Umpire’ Role, CONG.
QUARTERLY: CQ ROLL CALL (Dec. 19, 2016), available at 2016 WL 7335452.
142. Id.
143. Defining Larger Participants, supra note 23, at 37,497.
144. See id. at 37,519 n.144 (claiming that the CFPB, while formulating the proposed rule, had
already factored the costs that regulated entities would incur providing the information the CFPB
would request).
145. Id. at 37,520.
146. Id. at 37,522.
147. Id. at 37,523.
148. Zack et al., supra note 27.
149. Perez, supra note 47, at 407.
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compensation from markups can be used to offset lower purchase prices.”150
Moreover, critics argue that the costs of developing a comprehensive system to
ensure compliance with the CFPB,151 the $750,000 to $1 million that larger
companies would have to pay in preparation for the CFPB’s examinations, and
the costs of defending against a CFPB action will be passed on to consumers.152
Finally, critics argue that the CFPB is attempting to circumvent the auto dealer
exemption in Dodd-Frank to regulate dealers outside its jurisdiction.153
3. The Federal Trade Commission’s Role in Consumer Protection
The FTC also plays a role in the auto lending market by protecting consumers
from unfair, deceptive, and fraudulent trade practices.154 The FTC is permitted
under Dodd-Frank to prescribe rules regarding auto dealers.155 Specifically, the
FTC can regulate auto dealers who engage in “unfair methods of competition in
or affecting commerce, and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting
commerce.”156 The FTC also has authority to prescribe “rules which define with
specificity acts or practices which are unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or
affecting consumers.”157
The FTC has brought several actions against auto dealers through its
powers.158 Specifically, the FTC brought deceptive advertising actions.159 In
addition, the FTC collaborated with law enforcement officials to “target auto
finance application fraud, deceptive practices related to add-on products and
services, and deceptive advertising.”160
II. PROBLEMS WITH CFPB OVERSIGHT OF AUTO DEALERS
The exclusion of automobile dealers from Dodd-Frank has introduced a
myriad of issues into the subprime auto financing market. Underlying these

150. Id. at 420.
151. McDonald & Rojc, supra note 50, at 604–05. But see Defining Larger Participants, supra
note 23, at 37,520 (estimating that the total labor costs of an examination would be approximately
$27,611 and that this would account for “less than one-tenth of 1 percent of total revenue from
originations for that year.”).
152. Defining Larger Participants, supra note 23, at 37,520; Perez, supra note 47, at 427.
153. Zack et al., supra note 27; see Perez, supra note 45, at 409.
154. See The Auto Marketplace, FED. TRADE COMM’N, https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/med
ia-resources/consumer-finance/auto-marketplace (last visited Dec. 22, 2017).
155. See ABA SEC. OF ANTITRUST L., 2011 REVIEW OF CONSUMER PROTECTION LAW
DEVELOPMENTS 222–23 (Robin L. Moore et al. eds., 2011); CCH, supra note 59, at 499–500; see
also Yoest et al., supra note 56, at 226.
156. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (2012).
157. § 57a(a)(1)(B).
158. See Chamness et al., supra note 85, at 726–29.
159. Id. at 727–28.
160. Id. at 728–29.
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issues is the tension between consumer protection and freedom of contract.161
On one side, subprime auto lending has an established history of harming lowincome consumers and minorities.162 Given their decreased credit scores, such
individuals are prime targets for predatory lending practices that exasperate their
credit issues.163 Furthermore, access to personal transportation is often essential
to employment, given that ninety-one percent of Americans “commute to work
using their personal vehicles.”164 As such, individuals with subprime credit are
forced to take out loans that far exceed the value of the vehicle.165
On the other hand, consumers voluntarily enter into these financing contracts,
and proponents of deregulation argue that lenders should not be penalized for
extending credit to individuals whose poor credit scores ordinarily bar them
from financing.166 Having extended credit to risky borrowers, lenders need
some way to collect on defaulted loans.167 Without the monetary incentives,
lenders likely would be reluctant to make subprime loans, in turn depriving the
subprime borrowers of the financing to purchase vehicles they need to hold
employment.168
A. The CFPB’s Power to Protect Consumers
The CFPB possesses broad powers to regulate financial markets. Before the
implementation of the new Larger Participant rule, the CFPB had authority to
regulate large banks that directly financed automobile purchases by

161. See Abusive Car Loans, supra note 18 (“Of course, dealer-arranged financing is not
always a bad deal, and dealers should be fairly compensated for their services. But for many
consumers, especially for those without other financing options, dealer-arranged financing can lead
to unfair and deceptive lending, which is illegal under federal consumer financial law.”).
162. See id.
163. Sweeting, supra note 140, at 832.
164. See Kirk, supra note 90, at 73 (“While subprime mortgages and subprime vehicle loans
differ substantially, one difference in particular is simple but key: a consumer can forego purchasing
a home and rent one, but car ownership is a requisite for an overwhelming majority of American
households.”).
165. See Leonhard, supra note 26, at 281–82 (“The BHPH dealers target people who need cars
to get to work, but can’t qualify for conventional loans because of poor credit scores. Because the
buyers can’t obtain loans elsewhere, they have to pay interest at three times the going
rate or greater for regular used car loans.”).
166. See Austin Goolsbee, ‘Irresponsible’ Mortgages Have Opened Doors to Many of the
Excluded, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 29, 2007), http://www.nytimes.com/2007/03/29/business/29scen
e.html (“[T]he historical evidence suggests that cracking down on new mortgages may hit exactly
the wrong people. As Professor [Harvey S. Rosen of Princeton University] explains, ‘The main
thing that innovations in the mortgage market have done over the past 30 years is to let in the
excluded: the young, the discriminated against, the people without a lot of money in the bank to
use for a down payment.’ It has allowed them access to mortgages whereas lenders would have
once just turned them.”).
167. See Sweeting, supra note 140, at 826.
168. Kirk, supra note 90, at 73.
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consumers.169 After the new rule became effective, the CFPB had authority over
roughly ninety percent of the auto finance market.170 Although Dodd-Frank
explicitly excluded auto dealers from the authority of the CFPB, the CFPB
nonetheless oversees a vast majority of this market.171
Director Cordray argues that this regulation is necessary to protect consumers
who need automobiles for financial stability.172 However, this argument is a
rather weak justification for such broad regulatory action, particularly in the face
of a statute explicitly excluding auto dealers from the CFPB’s authority. Rather,
the regulation seems like a thinly veiled attempt by the CFPB to regulate one of
the only credit markets that remain outside its supervision.
Now that the Larger Participant rule is in place, a majority of previously
uncovered persons will be required to comply with the rules and regulations of
the CFPB. The $750,000 and $1 million per examination estimated by the rule’s
critics may very well be passed on to consumers.173 Although the cost of
compliance will likely decrease over time as the entities become more familiar
with the applicable regulations, this cost is unnecessary altogether because the
FTC already largely oversees this market.
Consequently, additional oversight by the CFPB would only further
complicate matters by duplicating powers between two agencies. The FTC is
charged with oversight for these types of transactions under largely the same
standard and has exercised its authority on numerous occasions.174 Moreover,
the “abusive” standard imposed by Dodd-Frank is a higher bar for entities to
comply with.175 Auto dealers were expressly excluded from the CFPB’s
jurisdiction and thus this higher standard. By circumventing this express act by
Congress, the CFPB has only added unnecessary costs through duplicative
oversight.
B. Likelihood of an Auto Loan Bubble
There has been growing concern about a bubble forming in the subprime auto
loan market, similar to the one in the mortgage market that contributed to the

169. Compare CFPB Proposes Federal Oversight, supra note 80 (noting that the CFPB’s
proposed role would include “nonbank auto finance entities” within its purview) with 12 U.S.C. §
5481(6) (2012) (defining the entities within the CFB’s purview as those “engag[ing] in offering or
providing a consumer financial product” and affiliates of those entities).
170. CFPB Proposes Federal Oversight, supra note 80.
171. See 12 U.S.C.A. § 5519(a) (2012); see also Article 6-582-2226, supra note 129.
172. CFPB Proposes Federal Oversight, supra note 80 (“Many people depend on auto
financing to pay for the car they need to get to work . . . . Nonbank auto finance companies extend
hundreds of billions of dollars in credit to American consumers, yet they have never been
supervised at the federal level . . . . Today’s proposal would extend our oversight, allowing us to
root out discrimination and ensure consumers are being treated fairly across this market.”).
173. See Defining Larger Participants, supra note 23, at 37,520.
174. See Chamness et al., supra note 85, at 727–28.
175. See Bainbridge, supra note 28, at 1783.
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financial collapse of 2008.176 Although auto lending is the third largest area of
consumer debt, the fear of another bubble can be attributed to the close temporal
proximity between increased levels of auto lending and the mortgage crisis.
Analysts and industry officials are aware of the current lending trends and have
repeatedly rejected the notion that another bubble is building.177
There are many factors that make the likelihood of another bubble unlikely.
First, the size of the auto loan market is, at most, less than an eighth of the size
of the housing market.178 Second, banks and other lenders are more heavily
regulated through Dodd-Frank and thus less likely to undertake the risks that
contributed to the mortgage crisis. Furthermore, recovering collateral is far
easier in auto lending than in mortgage lending. When a borrower defaults on
payments, lenders can recover a portion of their losses in a matter of days,
whereas in mortgage lending, lenders must wait months or years for the debtor’s
home to be foreclosed before they can recover.179 The increased certainty of a
quick recovery allows lenders to more accurately adjust their lending practices
going forward.180 Finally, after Dodd-Frank and the CFPB’s new Larger
Participant rule, there are few auto lenders that remain unregulated.
Although the delinquency rate of loans, particularly in the subprime area, still
concerns many,181 the delinquency rate is not necessarily the best indicator of
market vitality.182 A large portion of these delinquency rates have been
attributed to new lenders in the market.183 As these lenders become more
established and improve their risk analytics, it is likely that the delinquency rates
stabilize. Moreover, delinquencies account for only a tiny fraction of the overall
market.184 This, combined with the relative ease of repossession of collateral
and the substantially lower cost of an automobile as compared to a house, shows
that delinquency rates are not necessarily indicative of imminent financial
collapse.

176. See Smith, supra note 16 (“History has shown that aggressive subprime lending is
unfavorable to both subprime borrowers, investors and subprime lenders. Most recently, subprime
lending led to the rise and collapse of the housing bubble, in turn, this led to the U.S. subprime
mortgage crisis. Ultimately, subprime lending led to the U.S. recession between December 2007
and June 2009. Now, there is one industry that is reminiscent of the U.S. subprime mortgage lending
industry. The U.S. auto loan debt market has been slowly growing and some believe the bubble
will burst.”). But see Egan, supra note 15 (“It’s important to remember that auto loans don’t appear
to pose the systemic risk that mortgages did before they started the Wall Street meltdown of 2008.
Auto loans overall make up a much smaller universe of lending compared to mortgages. And banks
too are much stronger to deal with any potential losses.”).
177. See Assis & Beals, supra note 71; Holbrook, supra note 95.
178. See Assis & Beals, supra note 71; Holbrook, supra note 95.
179. Holbrook, supra note 95.
180. See id.
181. Id.
182. Fitch: Reprieve for U.S. Subprime Auto Delinquencies, supra note 91.
183. See id.
184. Id.
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III. ADDITIONAL REGULATION IS UNNECESSARY AND WOULD HARM
CONSUMERS
For good reason, many industry members, analysts, and academics feel that
the CFPB has substantially more power than needed to achieve its goals.
Although the CFPB has complied with its mandate to protect consumers in
financial markets, it has overstepped its authority in the auto lending market.
Dodd-Frank specifically excludes auto dealers from the authority of the CFPB.
It is reasonable to read the auto dealer exclusion as encompassing nonbank auto
finance companies generally, as evidenced by Senator Brownback’s rationale
for the section asserting that auto dealers were not responsible for the financial
crisis.185
The circumstances and the actions taken by regulators, banks, and mortgage
lenders before and leading up to the financial crisis are notably absent in the
current subprime auto lending market. In particular, while the deregulation of
the mortgage lending market was a significant contributor to the growth of the
housing bubble,186 the auto loan market is heavily regulated, with more than
ninety percent of lending entities currently regulated.187 Moreover, while
consumers view the purchase of real estate as an investment that has the potential
to increase in value,188 most consumers are aware that there is almost no
possibility of a vehicle rising in value and that most vehicles depreciate in value
as soon as the vehicle is driven off the lot.189 Thus, there is no comparable risk
in the auto lending market that a period of falling asset values will surprise vast
numbers of consumers.
The crux of the complaints regarding the auto lending market relate to unfair,
deceptive, and predatory practices. However, there is no need for the CFPB to
bring actions on these grounds as the FTC already oversees this area.
Authorizing the CFPB to bring actions on these grounds would only further
increase compliance costs by lenders, costs that would be passed on to
consumers through increased prices and higher interest rates. As Director
Cordray stated, automobiles are essential to maintaining employment and
financial stability. By introducing additional obstacles and increasing the prices
of automobiles, additional regulations may in fact harm the very consumers that
regulators seek to protect. Finally, regulations that further decrease the risk of
auto loan transactions for lenders by preventing them from making risky loans,
will disincentive lenders from extending credit to subprime borrowers. This
means that consumers will be less able to acquire the financing they need to
purchase vehicles.

185.
186.
187.
188.
189.

Perez, supra note 47, at 402; see Indiviglio, supra note 22.
Pitman, supra note 33, at 1093.
Article 6-582-2226, supra note 129.
See Kang, supra note 26, at 53; see also Matthews, supra note 13.
See Kang, supra note 26, at 53.
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IV. CONCLUSION
After the financial crisis of 2008, consumers and regulators were
understandably wary about lending practices. In recent years, subprime auto
lending has come under scrutiny, with many calling for additional regulation in
the auto finance market. The Dodd-Frank auto dealer exemption largely
prevents the CFPB from regulating the auto finance market. However, the
CFPB’s new definition of a “larger participant” leaves few auto lenders outside
the supervision of the Bureau. Despite contentions that additional regulations
are necessary to protect consumers, additional regulations may do more harm
than good by increasing prices and interest rates, and limiting consumer access
to credit.

